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Abstract: 
This paper provides a joint analysis of household stockholding participation, stock location among 
stockholding modes, and participation spillovers, using data from the US Survey of Consumer 
Finances. Our multivariate choice model matches observed participation rates, conditional and 
unconditional, and asset location patterns. Financial education and sophistication strongly affect direct 
stockholding and mutual fund participation, while social interactions affect stockholding through 
retirement accounts only. Household characteristics influence stockholding through retirement 
accounts conditional on owning retirement accounts, unlike what happens with stockholding through 
mutual funds. Although stockholding is more common among retirement account owners, this fact is 
mainly due to their characteristics that led them to buy retirement accounts in the first place rather than 
to any informational advantages gained through retirement account ownership itself. Finally, our 
results suggest that, taking stockholding as given, stock location is not arbitrary but crucially depends 
on investor characteristics. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past two decades, the US and major European countries have witnessed an expanded 
range of financial products such as mutual funds and retirement accounts, and a significant 
increase in household risk taking through investment in portfolios that could, inter alia, 
supplement the retirement income provided by underfunded social insurance systems. Stocks, 
owned either directly or indirectly through mutual funds or retirement accounts, represent a 
critical household investment vehicle, mainly because of their wealth generating potential over 
long investment horizons.  
Observed household portfolios are very heterogeneous in terms of the list of included 
assets, in contrast to the implications of simple ‘two-fund separation’ theorems derived in 
textbook models of asset pricing. Overall stock market participation is limited to about half of the 
population in the US; much fewer households own stocks directly or through mutual funds. 
Stockholders choose various combinations of stockholding modes, i.e., they favor different 
patterns of stock location. Households who own retirement accounts in order to meet the financial 
challenges of old age exhibit higher stockholding participation rates than the population at large. 
It is unclear, however, if such stock market participation is due to retirement account ownership 
per se (e.g because it confers some knowledge about investing in stocks) or rather to their own 
characteristics that are generally favorable to stockholding 
  These observations, documented below, pose a three-pronged issue relevant for research and 
policy: stock market participation, location of stocks, and participation spillovers from one asset 
(e.g. retirement accounts) to the other stockholding modes. Up to now, analysis of these three 
questions has been performed separately . The literature on participation has often studied overall 
stockholding without allowing for possible interactions across stockholding modes. On the other 
hand, the asset location literature, by definition, distinguishes across modes, but tends to analyze 2
each mode separately, due to the substantial technical difficulties associated with modeling 
numerous decisions jointly. The policy-relevant issue of participation spillovers is only recently 
starting to receive attention, mainly by focusing on suggestive descriptive statistics.
  To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the first integrated analysis of all three 
issues in the context of a unified model that allows for interrelationships among stockholding 
choices. Our  model enables us to estimate the separate effects of a given household characteristic 
or attitude on various choices, both unconditionally and conditionally on particular investment 
patterns. Allowing for such differential effects is justified by the different properties of the three 
stockholding modes. Direct stockholding is quite liquid, management-intensive and typically 
quite risky, due to limited diversification. Stock mutual funds are also quite liquid, but tend to be 
well-diversified and professionally managed. They require payment of fees, complex choices 
among numerous alternative funds, and costly performance monitoring. Investment in stocks 
directly and through mutual funds is on an after tax basis, and dividends and capital gains are 
taxable (albeit favorably). On the other hand, retirement accounts are typically tax-deferred, 
though much less liquid.  
Distinguishing across stockholding modes and allowing for correlations of their unobserved 
determinants is crucial for differentiating between conditional and unconditional probabilities of 
portfolio choices of interest; our approach is supported by economically and statistically 
significant estimates of such correlations, and by predicted participation rates that closely match 
the observed ones.
  We find sizeable effects of educational attainment, financial sophistication, and financial 
information (acquired through the Internet or by working in the financial sector) on both direct 
stockholding and ownership of mutual funds and retirement accounts, in contrast to the popular 
belief that assets requiring less active management represent ‘easy’ investment choices. Our 3
results suggest that owning  any mutual funds represents the major participation threshold for 
owning stock mutual funds: once it is crossed, education, financial sophistication, resources, race, 
and most financial attitudes are not relevant for investing in a stock mutual fund. In stark 
contrast, stock investment in retirement accounts, given that these are opened, is fostered by a set 
of characteristics similar to those inducing direct stockholding.
Our analysis of asset location provides further evidence of the powerful influence of gender 
on stockholding behavior. We find that, conditioning on ownership of stocks in any form, single 
males tend to invest in stocks directly, while females of similar characteristics tend to hold stock 
mutual funds. Overconfidence of males found in other contexts such as stock trading (Barber and 
Odean, 2001), could be relevant for this observed pattern. 
When studying participation spillovers, we find that retirement account owners are more 
likely to invest in other forms of stockholding than the general population. Crucially, this result is 
due to the characteristics that led them to own retirement accounts in the first place rather than to 
any informational spillovers from retirement account ownership. 
The issues studied in our paper are addressed in three separate strands of existing literature. 
The participation literature has attributed limited household participation in the stock market 
mainly to fixed entry/participation costs.
1 Possible factors that account for limited participation 
among well-to-do households (for whom such costs would not be a deterrent) include asset 
ignorance (Guiso and Jappelli, 2005), lack of trust (Guiso, Zingales and Sapienza, 2008), social 
interactions (Hong, Kubik and Stein, 2004), cognitive difficulties (Christelis, Jappelli and Padula, 
2006), and lack of financial literacy (Van Rooij, Alessie, and Lusardi , 2006). 
The importance of asset location has been stressed by Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) and  
Garlappi and Huang (2006), who put emphasis on tax considerations by studying possible 4
violations of optimal stock placement between taxable (such as directly held stocks and mutual 
funds) and tax-deferred vehicles (retirement accounts).  
Asset participation spillovers have not been extensively studied up to now, but are starting 
to receive attention in view of population aging and increased ownership of retirement accounts. 
An important research and policy question is whether ownership of retirement accounts, which is 
induced by the need to finance retirement, will also promote other forms of stockholding. 
Retirement accounts are regarded as the main factor behind the spread of stockholding in the US. 
A 2005 report by the Investment Company Institute and Securities Industry Association stresses 
the role of defined contribution pension plans, especially 401(k)s in this context.
2 A positive view 
of their role in promoting stockholding in Sweden is provided by Karlsson, Massa, and Simonov 
(2007).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents descriptive statistics on 
participation in the different stockholding modes and on asset location among stockholders. 
Section 3 presents the estimation model. Section 4 presents econometric results on participation 
in direct stockholding, mutual funds, retirement accounts, and in stockholding through mutual 
funds and retirement accounts. Section 5 presents our findings concerning asset location. Section 
6 discusses asset participation spillovers, while Section 7 offers concluding remarks. 
2. Stockholding Modes in the Data 
We use data from four waves (1995, 1998, 2001, and 2004) of the Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF), which is the only US survey that is representative of the whole population and 
provides detailed information on all three possible stockholding modes as well as on investors’ 
characteristics, attitudes and practices.
3 The dates chosen encompass the peak of the stock market 5
upswing of the middle and late nineties, the immediate aftermath of the stock market drop in 
2000, and part of the subsequent market recovery. 
Table 1 presents ownership rates in the data. Slightly more than half of households have 
retirement accounts, and more than three quarters of retirement account holders hold stocks in 
them. Stockholding through retirement accounts is the most widespread mode of stockholding, 
chosen by about 38% of the population (twice as much as direct stockholding). Approximately 
15% of households invest in stock mutual funds.
Looking at trends over our sample period, stockholding participation in general rose above 
the 50% mark in 2001, but then fell below it by 2004; this development is also reflected in each 
of the stockholding modes. Among mutual fund owners, however, the share of those investing in 
stock mutual funds has slightly increased since 1998. Participation in the other two modes was 
higher in 2004 than in 1998, but the popularity of stocks fell among retirement account holders.  
Table 2 refers to stock location, i.e., the use of the three (not mutually exclusive) 
stockholding options by stockholders. Approximately 80% of them have stocks in retirement 
accounts, which is by far the most popular location choice. About half as many stockholders 
invest in stocks directly, while under one third own stock mutual funds. The popularity of stock 
retirement accounts seems to have risen and then fallen over the period, as did that of stock 
mutual funds. However, direct stockholding kept rising throughout the period among those who 
owned stocks in any form. 
Table 3 provides additional information on stock location by reporting the distribution of 
stockholders among all possible combinations of stockholding modes. By far the most popular 
choice of stockholders is to hold stocks only in their retirement accounts (more than 40% of 
stockholders in all years). A distant but clear second is the combination of stocks in retirement 
accounts with direct stockholding. Use of all three modes is observed among slightly more than 6
10% of households. Interestingly, while percentages differ across years somewhat, the ranking of 
these options has remained the same for households in the stock market, despite dramatic market 
swings.
4
It is also instructive to contrast the distribution of demographic and economic 
characteristics of stockholders to that in the general population (shown in Table 4). Stockholding 
in any of the three modes, including the most common one, is undertaken by households quite 
different from the general population. Specifically, stockholders are more likely to be in a couple, 
college graduates, white, and in better health, and less likely to be unemployed. In terms of 
financial attitudes and practices, they are much more likely than the general population to assume 
a higher than average financial risk, to use the Internet for investing, and to consider leaving a 
bequest. Finally, stockholders tend to be far richer in terms of non-investment income and real 
and financial wealth, to be subject to a higher federal marginal tax rate and less likely to be credit 
constrained. Stockholders are more likely to work (or to have worked) in the financial sector, and 
less likely to work in an industry that exhibits high income risk.
5 All in all, the data in this section 
make it clear that the subsample of stockholders is substantially different in many important 
demographic and economic characteristics from the rest of the population. 
To summarize, we observe that, while participation rates in mutual funds and retirement 
accounts differ, the vast majority of fund holders and account owners include stocks in them. As 
our econometric results will show, however, this similarity in observed patterns conceals 
important differences across mutual funds and retirement accounts. Participation in mutual funds 
paves the way for inclusion of stocks in them almost regardless of household characteristics, 
while such characteristics are important for determining which subset of retirement account 
owners includes stocks in them. As for asset location, our finding that roughly 9 out of 10 7
stockholders do not use all three stockholding modes points to the importance of understanding 
what lies behind asset location choices among stockholders . 
3. The Model 
3.1. Description 
We build a model of household stock investment that features the decision process shown in 
Fig. 1. Households face three (not mutually exclusive) investment choices: direct stockholding 
and investment in mutual funds and retirement accounts. If any of the latter two saving vehicles is 
chosen, then the household has to further decide whether to invest in stocks through them. This 
decision tree reflects observed participation patterns in the SCF, where holders of stock mutual 
funds are a subset of mutual fund owners, and the same is true for retirement accounts. 
As pointed out, for instance, by Greene (1992), it is important for estimation to take into 
account the censoring in the data created by the fact that we do not observe stock investment in 
mutual funds (or retirement accounts) for those households that do not own any mutual funds 
(retirement accounts).
6 This goes beyond the logical necessity of having the broader instrument 
(e.g., mutual funds) in order to have the narrower instrument (e.g., stock mutual funds). Even in 
the absence of such logical necessity, a randomly drawn holder of, say, mutual funds would be 
more likely to own stock mutual funds than a household with similar characteristics chosen 
randomly from the whole population (comprising mutual fund owners and non-owners). This 
difference is due to the fact that, for any given configuration of observable characteristics, mutual 
fund owners have shown themselves to be willing to hold mutual funds in general; and they may 
have also acquired in the process specific information that facilitates ownership of stock mutual 
funds. As a result, a model that ignores the censoring issue and estimates the equation for stock 
investment in mutual funds on the whole sample can produce downward biased estimates of the 8
probability to invest in stock mutual funds conditional on mutual fund ownership. To put it 
another way, ignoring the censoring problem is akin to estimating a wage equation on the whole 
population, which includes not only those employed but also the unemployed and those out of the 
labor force. 
A key aspect of our model is that it allows for separate hurdles to be cleared for 
participating in each stockholding mode, and for potentially different contributions of each 
household characteristic or attitude to overcoming such hurdles. We further allow for all possible 
pair-wise correlations among the unobservables of each investment decision. Such correlations 
among investment decisions can arise because of factors common to all of them, such as an 
understanding of stockholding risks, common monitoring costs, and appreciation of the benefits 
of diversification (see Alessie, Hochguertel and van Soest, 2004). 
Our model could in principle be extended to include other household asset choices, e.g. 
housing, that might have unobservables correlated with those of stocks. Although this could be a 
worthwhile extension for future research, we chose not to go beyond the already involved task of 
integrating the three issues in this paper. First, adding a sixth or more equations makes our model 
even harder to estimate. Second, the considerable additional computational burden would not 
affect consistency of our estimates, but only potentially increase their efficiency, if unobservables 
are indeed correlated. As in a standard multivariate probit model, an added equation does not 
affect consistency but only efficiency.
Participation in mutual funds and retirement accounts is of interest in itself, but also as a 
first stage to the associated stockholding modes. The second stage decision may or may not be 
challenging, after the asset corresponding to the first stage has been chosen. For example, once 
somebody finds out about the nature, purpose, and rules of retirement accounts, the role and 
usefulness of stocks in these accounts may be quite clear. We would not, then, expect 9
characteristics that show financial sophistication or willingness to assume higher risks to have 
significant further roles in determining inclusion of stocks, conditional on having opened the 
retirement account. 
Our multivariate probit model with selection integrates participation analysis with asset 
location. The latter refers to the choice of a given mode conditional on the household holding 
stocks in any form, while allowing for all possible correlations across different choices. We 
discuss results on location in section 5. The issue of participation spillovers from retirement 
account ownership to other stockholding modes is discussed in Section 6. 
3.2. Econometric Specification 
The household decision process discussed above implies an empirical model that consists 
of a tri-variate probit with two further probit equations estimated on the selected samples of 
mutual fund and retirement account owners. The use of probit models adjusted for selectivity was 
pioneered by Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981). Another recent example of such models, in a 
different context from ours, is provided by Jenkins, Capellari, Lynn, Jäckel and Sala (2006). They 
use a bivariate probit specification with selection, i.e., with two equations for the selected 
samples, in order to study consent to give information during a survey interview.
7
In Table 5, the three first-stage equations (1), (2), and (4) model, respectively, the decisions 
to hold stocks directly, to hold any kind of mutual funds, and to have a retirement account. The 
two probit selection equations, (3) and (5), model the decisions to hold stock mutual funds given 
ownership of any mutual fund and to have a stock retirement account given ownership of a 
retirement account. We allow for unrestricted correlations between error terms of the five 
underlying latent indices.10
Table 4 shows summary statistics of our conditioning variables that have been found in the 
literature to be good predictors of stockholding (for examples that use the SCF  see Bertaut and 
Starr-McCluer, 2001; Bilias, Georgarakos and Haliassos, 2008). An important addition is the 
usually omitted federal marginal tax rate, whose computation is described in the data appendix. 
We construct our sample by pooling the data from the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 SCF waves 
(17,565 households).
8 In our specification we assume zero cohort effects and include time 
dummies.
9
The likelihood function distinguishes between the four possible outcomes of the first stage 
equations that denote indirect investment in stocks (through mutual funds and retirement 
accounts). We use the indices T {DS, M, MS, R, RS}, kT=2T-1, and represent the q-variate 
normal distribution by ĭq(.).
10 The likelihood can be written as follows: 
1) No investment in mutual funds, no investment in retirement accounts: 
) , , ; , , ( 3 1 QH H Q U U U J D T R M u R DS u M DS R M DS k k k k k k G k Z k X k L c c c )                                      (7) 
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with kM= -1, kR= 1, kDS= 1 r  and kRS= 1 r11
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with kM= kR= 1, kDS= 1 r , kMS= 1 r  and kRS= 1 r
Thus the overall contribution to the log likelihood by any given household is:
4 3
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L RS MS L RS MS
L RS MS L RS MS L
     
          
                     (11) 
        We use multiple imputation estimation methods to handle additional uncertainty induced by 
multiple imputation in the SCF (see Kennickell, 2000).
11 Given that multiple integrals appear in 
the likelihood terms, L1, L2, L3, L4, we evaluate them by simulated maximum likelihood using the 
Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator (see Geweke, 1989; Keane, 1994).
12 Our results 
are robust to many different initial conditions for the vector of parameters.  
It is worthwhile to note that our full maximum likelihood estimation procedure does not 
require exclusion restrictions for identification, as is also the case with the standard multivariate 
probit model (see Greene, 2007). Our multivariate probit model with censoring consists, in effect, 
of four multivariate probit specifications estimated on four different subsamples, as can be seen 
from (7)-(10). Identification in our model is further assisted by the fact that different equations 
are estimated on different subsamples, unlike the case with a standard multivariate probit where 
all equations appear in all possible subsamples (see Schmidt, 1981, and Gao, Lahiri and Wixon, 
2001, on the usefulness of sample separation information).
13
Regression coefficients may give a misleading picture of the effect of a regressor in a non-
linear multi-equation model with correlated disturbances. This result can obtain because 
coefficients do not reflect the regressor’s influence that is due to its presence in the equations for 
the other choices and that could be transmitted to the equation of interest through the cross-12
correlated disturbances. Therefore, we focus on the marginal effects of the regressors (coefficient 
estimates are shown in Table A.1). Given that correlations of disturbances can have substantial 
effects on calculation of probabilities, we check their joint statistical significance (Appendix B).
          An attractive feature of the model is that it allows the computation of a wide range of 
probabilities pertaining to participation, location, and spillovers. A given asset combination 
reflected in a particular value of the five-element vector of choices (DS, M, MS, R, RS)  has a 
probability given by: 
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where lMSW’ȕ (lRSY’į) does not appear in Ɏq when M=0 (L=0). The same is true for all terms 
involving lMS (lRS) in U . We can express the probability of any asset choice as the sum of 
probabilities of all asset combinations in which this choice is observed, since asset combinations 
are mutually exclusive.
14 As an example, the probability of investing in stock mutual funds 
conditional on owning mutual funds can be expressed as
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The reduction in the dimensionality of the normal integrals implied by the last equality in 
(13) does not generally extend to more complicated choices of interest, e.g. to the probability of 13
owning stocks in mutual funds conditional on owning stocks in any form, which is equal to  
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where AS denotes investment in stocks in any form, and the summation in the denominator is 
over all asset combinations in which stocks are held in at least one mode.
15 Marginal effects are 
computed as the change in the probabilities when there is an appropriately defined change in the 
value of the regressor.
16 We estimate  probabilities and marginal effects and their standard errors 
via Monte Carlo simulation (Appendix C).  
3.3. Model Performance 
In Table 6, we display predicted participation rates, both conditional and unconditional, 
generated by estimated probabilities. Our estimates match closely the corresponding participation 
rates observed in the data, although the model was not calibrated with this objective in mind. This 
suggests that our model has considerable predictive power for population stockholding choices. 
Our model makes it possible to estimate also marginal effects regarding ownership of any
type of stocks,
17 i.e. the question that existing participation literature normally addresses without 
differentiating across paths to stockholding. Marginal effects derived from our model are reported 
in Table 7, column 1, together with the corresponding ones (shown in column 3) from a ‘typical’ 
participation regression found in the existing literature on stockholding.
It is reassuring, both for the existing literature on stockholding participation and for our 
model, that estimated marginal effects for overall stockholding are very similar, in sign, size and 14
patterns of significance. For example, a college degree adds remarkably to the probability of 
stockholding, about 26 percentage points (pp). Having a high-school certificate rather than not 
adds about 15 pp. Being white, willing to take substantial risks, and having other than poor health 
contribute more than 10 pp each, using either our model or the simple participation regression. 
  The similarity of the results obtained from both models suggests that the standard practice of 
merging three different stockholding modes is not misleading when overall stockholding 
participation is of interest. However, our model allows a novel anatomical probe into influences 
of observables on the different paths to stockholding, the correlations between unobservable 
influences, the hitherto unexplored link between asset participation and asset location, and the 
issue of participation spillovers across assets, in the context of a single estimation model 
consistent both with the data and with existing findings on overall participation.
4. The Different Paths to Stockholding 
Although direct stockholding, stock mutual funds, and stock retirement accounts all expose 
households to stockholding risk, they vary in their diversification properties, liquidity, and 
informational requirements on the part of investors. Given these differences, it is quite plausible 
that specific household characteristics will have differential contributions to participation across 
stockholding modes 
In this section, we employ our model to estimate contributions of various household 
characteristics to the use of each possible stockholding mode, controlling for other observed 
factors and allowing for correlations across model nodes induced by unobserved factors. For 
stockholding through mutual funds and retirement accounts, this consists of two steps: the 
marginal contribution to opening the account, and that to including stocks in it given ownership 
of the account. Results are presented in Table 8. 15
4.1. Direct Stockholding 
The first column presents marginal effects for direct stockownership. We observe that 
overall educational attainment and financial sophistication play a major role in the choice of this 
stockholding mode. The single most important contribution comes from having a college degree, 
which raises participation probability by more than 17 pp over that of a high school dropout.
18
This result is likely linked to lower entry and participation costs that result from greater 
knowledge of how the market works and ability to analyze new information.  
Participation in direct stockholding is further increased by about 4 pp if a household 
member works in the financial sector. This finding likely arises partly from financial knowledge 
and information that this member brings home and partly from bonuses and payments in stocks. 
Consistent with findings of Bogan (2008), use of the Internet makes a strong contribution 
of about 7 pp. This effect is likely to reflect the easier access to investment information and 
cheaper portfolio management available to Internet users, and it is net of education and financial 
information acquired through employment in the financial sector. Asking friends or relatives for 
investment advice does not affect the probability of direct stockholding. At first glance this result 
seems to contradict the findings of Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) on social interactions. 
However, it is consistent with their conjecture that social interactions may not influence or may 
even hurt participation in assets not widely held, as is the case with directly held stocks; a random 
prospective investor would have about one chance in five to find direct stockholders in her social 
circle.
19
Household attitudes, motives, and practices also have important effects, even after 
controlling for education, information and resources. The second largest marginal contribution to 
direct stockholding comes from willingness to undertake substantial financial risk (almost 9 pp). 16
Having a long investment horizon (more than 10 years) also contributes to direct stockholding by 
2.6 pp. 
Poor health has a sizeable negative contribution to direct stockholding of roughly 5 pp, 
which is consistent with existing findings (Rosen and Wu, 2004) and with the view that direct 
stockholding imposes considerable demands on investing households.  
Household (taxable) resources play an important role in the decision to hold stocks directly. 
The semi-elasticity of real wealth is 2 pp while that of net financial wealth (directly held stocks 
excluded)
20 is .4 pp. Background income risk associated with working in a high-risk sector also 
lowers the chances of direct stockholding. Interestingly, the experience of binding borrowing 
constraints (or concern about being turned down) does not deter direct stockholding.
Finally, the estimated effect of the federal marginal tax rate is positive.
21 Given that we are 
controlling for resources, a higher marginal tax rate means that the household is able to take 
fewer income tax deductions, but this does not discourage it from taxable direct stockholding. 
The more favorable tax treatment of dividends, the fact that capital gains are taxed only at 
realization, and the possibility of foregoing capital gains tax if stocks are passed on to 
descendants (‘step up of basis’) apparently combine to encourage direct stockholding among 
households facing higher marginal tax rates. The importance of such considerations is 
corroborated by estimated marginal effects of variables more directly linked to bequest motives: 
having received inheritance and planning to leave a bequest contribute about 4.6 and 6.4 pp 
respectively. 
4.2. Stockholding through Mutual Funds 
Unlike direct stockholding, mutual funds are typically managed by professionals and are 
well-diversified. These features often lead to the presumption that mutual funds investments are 17
open to all households because they do not require considerable financial sophistication and 
information gathering. Our findings are not consistent with this view, as can be seen in column 3 
of Table 8. Educational attainment makes a considerable contribution to participation in mutual 
funds, with estimated marginal effects of a college degree at least as large as those for direct 
stockholding. Internet use and having worked in the financial sector continue to be play an 
important role, albeit somewhat smaller than for direct stockholding.
These findings are consistent with the view that the proliferation of mutual funds has 
reintroduced informational requirements from the back door: households now face a need to 
collect information on how to choose among the huge variety of mutual funds and on how to 
monitor those who run them.
22 More educated households are more likely to understand and 
appreciate their advantages including risk diversification, and may be more heavily targeted by 
marketing campaigns of mutual funds. Even if mutual funds do not require as much information 
gathering as direct stockholding does, the effects of the Internet and working in the financial 
sector are still important. Social interactions have no statistically significant effect. This is 
consistent with our findings for direct stockholding and the fact that mutual funds are not widely 
held.
Household investment attitudes and practices clearly induce investment in mutual funds. A 
long investment horizon matters a lot, as mutual funds that are professionally managed are suited 
for households that adopt a ‘buy and hold’ strategy for the longer run. The estimated effect is 
larger than that for direct stockholding. The choice to participate in mutual funds is also heavily 
influenced by expressed willingness to undertake substantial financial risk (6.5 pp). Interestingly, 
race is highly significant and quantitatively important in the mutual fund industry. A standard 
conjecture for interpreting such findings on race in the stock market participation literature is that 18
the financial services industry targets minorities less for its advertising. It should be recognized, 
however, that there is no direct evidence to substantiate this conjecture. 
Column 5 in Table 8 reports marginal effects for the choice to hold stock mutual funds, 
given that the household owns any mutual funds at all. Interestingly, the only factor among those 
mentioned above that matters for this conditional choice of stockholding mode is willingness to 
assume financial risk. These results suggest that opening a mutual fund account represents the 
major participation threshold. Once it is crossed, education, financial sophistication, resources, 
race, and most financial attitudes are not relevant for the choice to invest in a stock mutual fund. 
This is a new result made possible by the design of our model.
23
4.3 Stockholding in Retirement Accounts 
Marginal effects for ownership of retirement account are shown in column 7 of Table 8. It 
is striking that education has a sizeable role to play in retirement account ownership, even after 
controlling for other household characteristics and attitudes. The estimated size of the marginal 
effect of a college degree is just less than 23 pp compared to a household where the financial 
decision maker is a high-school dropout, but even that of a high-school certificate is about 14 pp. 
It is also notable that being white increases the probability of participation in retirement accounts 
by 9 pp and that declaring poor health reduces it by 12 pp. These findings suggest that there are 
significant obstacles to opening retirement accounts that could in principle be alleviated by the 
financial industry itself, through more efficient and widespread advertising of this instrument, or 
by governments through more effective campaigns and specially designed ‘default options’.
  Declared willingness to undertake significant risks for substantial returns contributes 9 pp 
to the probability of participation, an estimate greater than that for mutual funds and comparable 
to the risky option of direct stockholding. This finding suggests that the public perception 19
regarding retirement accounts is still that of a quite risky instrument. The effect of having a long 
investment horizon is indeed greater in size than those for the more liquid instruments of direct 
stockholding and mutual funds. Not surprisingly, having received a bequest, and expecting to 
leave a bequest all contribute significantly to owning a retirement account. 
A difference from direct stockholding and mutual funds is found in the effect of social 
interactions, which is now positive and significant (at the 10% level). Given that the majority of 
households own retirement accounts, this positive effect is another indication that social 
interactions contribute to participation when asset ownership is widespread. 
Richer households and those in a higher federal marginal tax bracket are substantially more 
likely to participate in retirement accounts. The latter is now partly due to gains such households 
could reap from tax deferrals. Being credit constrained reduces significantly the probability of 
investing in a retirement account. Given that we control for economic resources, this result is not 
simply due to being ‘poorer’. Perceived inability to borrow probably discourages participation in 
plans that imply payment commitments over a prolonged period of time, for fear of being unable 
to meet them every period.   
  Interestingly, the conditional choice to include stocks in a retirement account deciding to 
invest in one is sensitive to a set of household characteristics very similar to those contributing to 
direct stockholding. As can be seen in column 9 of Table 8, stockholding through retirement 
accounts is fostered by being married, being more educated, being white, more willing to 
undertake risk, having a long investment horizon, using the Internet, having greater net real 
wealth, and declaring an intention to leave a bequest. It is also encouraged by social interactions, 
strengthening their role found in the participation equation. 
The contrast with stocks in mutual funds is quite striking. While there are hardly any 
characteristics favoring the placement of stocks in mutual funds once such funds have been 20
opened, there is a distinct second participation hurdle to be overcome for including stocks in the 
retirement account, once households have opened such an account. 
4.4 Correlations between Unobserved Factors 
As already discussed, a key feature of our econometric model is that it allows estimation of 
correlations in participation decisions induced by unobserved factors. The bottom panel of Table 
8 reports the matrix of estimates of these correlations. There is positive and significant correlation 
between unobserved factors influencing participation in mutual funds and stock investment in 
mutual funds. Thus, the sample of stock mutual fund investors is a selected one. We also find 
some evidence of selectivity (with a p-value of 0.075) in the equations for owning retirement 
accounts and stock investment in those accounts. The presence of selectivity in indirect 
stockholding choices makes it important that empirical specifications allow for it, so that   
inconsistent estimates can be avoided. Our choice to allow for possible correlations across other 
nodes, as well, is also supported by estimates of such correlations.
24 When we test for the joint 
significance of all the cross-equation correlations, we find that we can decisively reject the null of 
no significance (details can be found in Appendix B). This result is another indication that these 
correlations need to be taken into account when modeling household stockholding.
5. Asset Location: What Influences where Stockholders Keep their Stocks? 
We now turn to the asset location issue, namely, to the factors that contribute to each of the 
three possible stockholding choices, conditional on the household holding any stocks (i.e. 
conditional on being in at least one of the three nodes involving stocks).
25 In terms of descriptive 
statistics, Table 3 shows the fractions of stockholders choosing each possible combination of 
stockholding modes, and allows us to see the most popular placement options. By adding the 21
relevant percentages in the last column, it can be seen that almost three quarters of stockholders 
hold combinations that include stocks in retirement accounts, about 40% hold combinations that 
entail direct stockholding, while about 30% place stocks in mutual funds. 
Table 9 reports estimated marginal effects for all three stockholding modes, conditional on 
holding stocks in any form. Single males tend to locate their investments in stocks held directly, 
while their female counterparts in stock mutual funds. Financial sophistication, as captured by 
educational attainment, use of the Internet for financial information, and working or having 
worked in the financial sector, makes no contribution to the choice of stock retirement accounts 
among those who have mastered what is needed to acquire stocks in any form. By contrast, 
education and Internet contribute to the other two choices. Work in the financial sector induces 
direct stockholding only, possibly because such investment is the most information-intensive. On 
the other hand, social interactions induce stockholding only through retirement accounts that 
represent the most widely held mode. 
Willingness to undertake substantial risk makes a greater contribution to direct 
stockholding than to the other two modes, while a long investment horizon favors indirect 
holdings. Race continues to matter even among stockholders: minority households exhibit on 
average lower probabilities of using the first two modes (by about 6 pp), and by about half of this 
for putting stocks in retirement accounts.  
The pattern of marginal effects for direct stockholding is quite similar, whether they refer to 
participation or to asset location (as shown in Table 8, column 1 and Table 9, column 1). This 
implies that whether we draw from the general population or we condition on the household 
being a stockholder does not make a significant difference with respect to the hurdle the 
household needs to pass in order to hold stocks directly. Intuitively, given that most stockholders 
own stocks in retirement accounts, conditioning on stock ownership essentially picks out stock 22
retirement account owners. Our results, therefore, suggest that participation in stock retirement 
accounts does not particularly simplify the task of holding stocks directly. 
As already discussed, passing the threshold for mutual fund ownership is very important for 
participation in stock mutual funds; household characteristics make a limited contribution to 
owning stock mutual funds, when the conditioning event is ownership of mutual funds. By 
contrast, the strong marginal effects for stock mutual fund ownership shown in col. 3 of Table 9 
are due to the much weaker conditioning event of owning stocks in any form. Only about 36% of 
stockholders in our sample have also passed the participation threshold for mutual funds; 
therefore, there is considerable remaining room for characteristics to induce stock mutual fund 
ownership.
Finally, it is quite striking that we find a number of significant marginal effects for placing 
stocks in retirement accounts when conditioning on any stockholding, even though 80% of 
stockholders own stock retirement accounts. Obviously these effects regard the remaining 20%, 
who consider extending stockholding from taxable liquid accounts to the tax-deferred and less 
liquid retirement accounts. Our results imply that such an extension is significantly encouraged 
by characteristics like occupation (being an employee and not working in a high-risk sector), 
attitudes (expressing willingness to take above average financial risk, having a long investment 
horizon), race, and being subject to a higher marginal tax rate. 
6. Asset Participation Spillovers 
In this Section, we explore the implications of having passed the ownership threshold of 
retirement accounts for each stockholding mode: direct, through mutual funds, and through 
retirement accounts. Table 6 reports observed participation rates and corresponding predictions of 
our model. Proportions of stockholders in any form are higher among retirement account owners 23
than in the general population. Among such owners, 75% own stocks in their retirement accounts, 
30% own stocks directly, and 23% own stocks in mutual funds. The corresponding proportions in 
the general population are much lower: 38%, 19%, and 14%. As discussed above, our model 
matches quite well all conditional and unconditional participation rates observed in the data. 
Based on these numbers, owning a retirement account implies higher probabilities of owning 
stocks in any form. Is this because the process of opening and maintaining a retirement account 
facilitates stock ownership, e.g. by familiarizing households with asset holding, investment 
opportunities, managed funds, etc? Or is it because households who have retirement accounts 
have characteristics and attitudes more conducive to stockholding anyway?  
Table 4, which describes the various samples, shows that, relative to the general population, 
owners of retirement accounts are more likely to have a college degree, to be willing to assume 
above average financial risk, to have received inheritance and consider leaving a bequest, to have 
an investment horizon longer than 10 years, to be richer in income and wealth, to use the Internet 
to obtain financial information; and less likely to be liquidity constrained. In other words, 
summary statistics suggest that owners of retirement accounts are more likely to have 
characteristics that facilitate stockholding.
Is there anything beyond this? If the process of acquiring and owning a retirement account 
itself significantly facilitates stockholding either directly or through stock mutual funds, we 
would expect household characteristics and attitudes to make less of a difference to stockholding 
through these modes once we condition on having retirement accounts.
26 For example, having a 
college degree or using the Internet should make less of a difference to whether retirement 
account owners (rather than the general population) participate in directly held stocks or stock 
mutual funds. Technically, marginal effects on participation in these other forms of stockholding, 24
conditional on retirement account ownership, should be insignificant or much smaller than the 
unconditional ones which refer to an investor picked randomly from the whole population.  
  Conditional marginal effects are presented in Table 10, column 1 for directly held stocks 
and in column 3 for stock mutual funds. For comparison, column 1 in Table 8, and column 5 in 
Table 10 report the corresponding unconditional marginal effects. We observe that conditioning 
on participation in retirement accounts does not change the sign or significance of contributions 
of household characteristics, attitudes, and practices to participation in direct stockholding and in 
stock mutual funds; and, if anything, it increases the estimated size of such contributions, 
including those linked to financial awareness and sophistication. Having a college degree or 
more, using the Internet to obtain financial information, and working or having worked in the 
financial sector are estimated to contribute more to participation in directly held stocks or in stock 
mutual funds when conditioning on participation in retirement accounts. The above findings 
challenge the hypothesis that the participation process for retirement accounts provides sufficient 
information and awareness to facilitate other forms of stockholding. 
All in all, our findings imply that retirement account owners represent a pool more likely to 
invest in other forms of stockholding than the general population, but this is mainly because of 
characteristics that led them to buy retirement accounts in the first place rather than of any 
informational advantages gained through retirement account ownership itself.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
We have estimated an econometric model flexible enough to address in an integrated 
framework the interrelated issues of stock market participation, stock location, and participation 
spillovers. The model distinguishes between different stockholding modes and allows for 25
differential impact of household characteristics on participation in each of them and for 
correlations of unobservables across all asset choices.
Distinguishing stockholding modes is economically justified, in view of their differences in 
terms of riskiness, liquidity, diversification and management requirements. Importantly, making 
such a distinction and allowing for correlated choices are also supported by our econometric 
findings; predicted participation rates closely match the observed ones and correlations among 
unobservables are typically economically and statistically significant. While the model offers a 
number of insights into differences and correlations across modes, its results are consistent with 
existing studies when it is put to the simpler task of estimating overall stock market participation.  
Our findings stress the importance of educational attainment and financial information 
(acquired through the Internet or by working in the financial sector), even for assets held in 
managed accounts. Still, we find a striking difference between stock mutual funds and stocks in 
retirement accounts. The probability that any mutual fund owner holds stock mutual funds is 
basically the same regardless of characteristics. In contrast, stock retirement accounts tend to be 
chosen by retirement account owners with characteristics similar to those favoring direct 
stockholding in the general population. This is despite the likely greater degree of diversification 
in stock retirement accounts compared to individual stocks.
On the issue of asset location, we find that household characteristics continue to matter for 
the choice of stockholding mode even among stock owners. The contribution of characteristics 
like education, willingness to assume higher risks, and information gained through the Internet to 
direct stockholding remains essentially the same, whether this choice is made by a stockholder or 
by a randomly picked person in the general population. There are also strong effects of these 
characteristics for stock mutual fund ownership conditional on owning stocks of any type. 
Investment attitudes, like willingness to assume higher risks and a longer investment horizon, 26
matter for locating stocks in retirement accounts when conditioning on stockholding, despite the 
fact that 80% of stockholders own stock retirement accounts.
Last but not least, the multivariate structure of our model also allows examination of 
participation spillovers. Our study confirms that retirement account owners represent a pool more 
likely to invest in other forms of stockholding than the general population. However, our   
findings imply that this propensity is mainly due to the characteristics that led them to own 
retirement accounts in the first place rather than of any informational or other advantages gained 
through retirement account ownership itself.  
Our results have implications both for policy and for financial practice. First, the significant 
role that financial sophistication and information have in facilitating investment in all three 
stockholding modes,
27 as well as in influencing stock location and the extent of participation 
spillovers from retirement accounts to stocks held directly and through mutual funds, can provide 
further support to programs that promote household financial literacy (see e.g. Lusardi, 
forthcoming). Second, while owning retirement accounts makes stock ownership in all three 
modes more likely, the spread of retirement accounts does not guarantee investment in stocks, 
either within retirement accounts or outside them. For example, the less educated, less wealthy, 
more risk averse and those with shorter planning horizons are less likely to overcome the 
additional hurdle for stock ownership in any of the three modes, even if they own a retirement 
account. Appropriate use of default options in occupational retirement plans could steer 
households towards or away from stockholding, according to policy objectives. Finally, our 
findings on characteristics conducive to participation in certain assets, could be of use to financial 
practitioners interested in understanding how people decide to invest in a particular financial 
product, either independently of or, crucially, in conjunction with other such products. 27
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Appendix A: Description of Assets and Variables
I.  Asset Categories (Table 1)
Directly held stocks: [1]
[1] publicly traded stocks 
Mutual funds: [2] + [3] + [4] + [5] + [6] + [7] 
[2] money market mutual funds (money market accounts used for checking and other money 
market account held at institutions other than commercial banks, savings and loans, savings 
banks, and credit unions) 
[3] tax-free bond mutual funds 
[4] government bond mutual funds 
[5] other bond mutual funds 
[6] stock mutual funds 
[7] combination and other mutual funds 
Stocks in mutual funds: [6] + ½ * [7] 
Retirement accounts: [8] + [9] + [10] + [11] 
[8] quasi-liquid retirement accounts (IRAs and thrift-type accounts) individual retirement 
accounts/Keoghs
[9] account-type pension plans (included if type is 401k, 403b, thrift, savings, SRA, or if 
participant has option to borrow or withdraw) 
[10] other managed assets (trusts, annuities and managed investment accounts in which 
household has equity interest) 
[11] future pensions (accumulated in an account) 
Stocks in retirement accounts:  [12] + [13] + [14] 
[12] IRAs/Keoghs invested in stock (full value if mostly invested in stock,31
       1/2 value if split between stocks/bonds or stocks/money market, 
       1/3 value if split between stocks/bonds/money market). 
[13] thrift-type retirement accounts invested in stock (full value if mostly invested in   
        stock, 1/2 value if split between stocks and interest earning assets) 
[14] Other managed assets w/equity interest: annuities, trusts, MIAs (full value if   
        mostly invested in stock, 1/2 value if split between stocks/MFs & bonds/CDs,
        or "mixed/diversified", 1/3 value if "other") 
II. Definitions of Variables 
IIA. Economic Variables 
Net Financial Wealth: Total Financial Assets –  Other lines of credit - Credit Card Debt - 
Installment loans - Other Debt (loans against pensions, loans against life insurance, margin loans, 
miscellaneous) 
Net Real Wealth: [1] + [2] + [3] + [4] + [5] - [6] - [7] - [8] 
[1] Wealth in Primary Residence: Gross value of primary residence 
[2] Other Residential Real Estate (includes land contracts/notes household has made, properties - 
other than the principal residence - classified under certain codes for family residences, time 
shares and vacations homes) 
[3] Gross equity in Non-residential Real Estate (real estate - other than the principal residence, 
properties classified under certain codes for family residences, time shares, and vacation homes) 
[4] Business Equity (for businesses where the HH has an active interest, value is net equity if 
business were sold today, plus loans from HH to business, minus loans from business to HH not 
previously reported, plus value of personal assets used as collateral for business loans that were 32
reported earlier; for businesses where the HH does not have an active interest, market value of the 
interest)
[5] Other Wealth: value of vehicles plus other non-financial miscellaneous assets 
[6] Principal Residence Debt (mortgage, home equity loans and HELOCs --mopup LOCs divided 
between HE and other) 
[7] Debt for Other Residential Property (includes land contracts, residential property other than 
the principal residence, misc. vacation, and installment debt reported for cottage/vacation home) 
[8] Debt for non-residential real estate mortgages and other loans taken out for investment real 
estate 
Income: income from wages, salaries, professional practice or business unemployment 
compensation, social security, annuity, or other pensions. 
All monetary values have been deflated using the CPI-U-Research Series index and are expressed 
in 2004 prices. 
IIB. Household Attributes 
No high school diploma (omitted variable): Highest grade completed (X5901)<12 & No high 
school diploma or passed equivalent test (X5902=5) 
High school graduate: Highest grade completed (X5901)<12 & Has got high school diploma 
(X5902=1) or passed equivalent test (X5902=2) OR Highest grade completed (X5901)=12 OR  
Highest grade completed (X5901)>12 & No college degree (X5904=5) 
College graduate: Highest grade completed (X5901)>12 & Has got a college degree (X5904)=1 33
Credit constrained: Indicates household response that it has been turned down for credit in the 
past five years or did not receive amount originally requested or did not apply for credit because 
it thought it might be turned down. 
Willingness to take above average financial risk: The survey question is “Which of the 
following statements comes closest to the amount of financial risk that you and your 
(spouse/partner) are willing to take when you save or make investments? 
            1.  take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns 
            2.  take above average financial risks expecting to earn above average returns 
            3.  take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns 
            4. not willing to take any financial risks” 
The dummy represents those answering 1 or 2. (X3014=1 or X3014=2). 
Investment Horizon>10 years: The dummy represents those declaring that a period longer than 
10 years is important when making their family’s saving and spending plan (X3008) 
Health poor: The survey question is “Would you say your health is excellent, good, fair, or 
poor?” Those describing their health as being poor are represented by the dummy (X6030=4). 
Bequest motive: Yes to “Do you expect to leave a sizable estate to others?” (X5825=1). 
Has received inheritance: Yes to “Have you ever received an inheritance, or been given 
substantial assets in a trust or in some other form?” (X5801=1). 
Asks Friends, Relatives, Work contacts for financial information / Uses Internet to obtain 
financial information: when answering “7.Friend/Relative or 18.Material from work/business 
contacts” / “5.online service/internet” to the following question: “How do you make decisions 
about savings and investments?” 34
Household work(s/ed) in the financial industry: The dummy represents households in which 
any member of the couple works in the "Finance, Insurance & Real Estate" or "Business & 
Repair Services" sectors (x7402, x7412). The same applies to those who currently work full or 
part time in a different sector or they do not work (unemployed, inactive or retired) and they used 
to work in the past in one of these two sectors (x7406, x7416 / x7408, x7418 / x7410, x7420). 
Works in high-risk industry sector: Head works in one of the following industry sectors 
(x7402): Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining & Construction 
IIC. Federal marginal tax rate 
Household federal marginal income tax rates are computed by using the programs created by 
Moore (2003), which generate taxable income items from SCF data. The programs’ output is then 
input to the NBER TAXSIM federal income tax model which produces the appropriate tax rate. 
To avoid endogeneity of the tax rate, we follow Alessie, Hochguertel and van Soest (2004) in 
replacing each household’s dividend income from direct and indirect stockholding (x5708, 
x5710, x5712)  with the average household dividend income computed from the relevant SCF 
wave.
Appendix B: Tests of Correlations Across Disturbances  
We use the F-test suggested by Li, Raghunathan and Rubin (1991) to account for the 
uncertainty induced by multiple imputation. We first perform the test by including all correlation 
coefficients except two, namely the correlations ȡvn and ȡİe of the errors that reflect selection 
within the two saving vehicles of mutual funds and retirement accounts. The value of the F-
statistics is equal to 51.8 (p-value: 0), which strongly rejects the null hypothesis of zero 
correlation of the errors across the three saving vehicles (direct stocks, mutual funds and 35
retirement accounts) and the two second stage equations. When we add the correlation of the 
errors within the two saving vehicles of mutual funds and retirement accounts the F-statistic is 
equal to 43.4 (p-value: 0), again strongly rejecting the null. Thus, we cannot ignore the 
correlations of the unobserved factors across equations when computing the probabilities of asset 
choices of interest. 
Appendix C: Estimates and Standard Errors of Probabilities and Marginal Effects 
Given that probabilities and marginal effects are non-linear functions of the estimated 
coefficients, we calculate them by simulation. We proceed as follows: 
i) We draw from the distribution of the maximum likelihood coefficients assuming 
that they are distributed normally with means and variance-covariance matrix 
equal to the maximum likelihood estimates.  
ii) For a given parameter draw we compute the probabilities and marginal effects for 
each household and then we take the weighted average of those magnitudes across 
households, i.e., we compute the average magnitude corresponding to that draw.
28
iii) The final estimate of the magnitude of interest and its standard error are then 
computed as the mean and standard deviation respectively of the distribution of 
the average magnitudes in ii) across all parameter draws. 36
Table 1: Ownership Rates 
Year Stocks
Directly
Mutual
Funds 
Stocks in 
Mutual Funds
[among
Mutual Fund 
Owners]
Retirement
Accounts
Stocks in 
Retirement
Accounts
 [among 
Retirement
Account
Owners]
1995 15.2 15.3  11.3
[74.1] 46.5 30.3
[65.2]
1998 19.2 19.5  15.2
[78.0] 50.8 39.2
[77.0]
2001 21.3 21.1  16.7
[79.0] 54 43.4
[80.5]
2004 20.7 17.9  14.3
[79.9] 52.1 39.6
[76.0]
        
Notes: Data from the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 waves of the SCF. The reported statistics are 
weighted and corrected for multiple imputation. Asset definitions are provided in the Appendix. 37
Table 2: Stock Ownership Rates among Stocks 
Owners 
Year Stocks
Directly 
Stocks in 
Mutual
Funds 
Stocks in 
Retirement
Accounts
1995 37.7 28.0 75.0 
1998 39.3 31.1 80.1 
2001 41.0 32.1 83.6 
2004 42.5 29.4 81.5 
           
Notes: Data from the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 waves of the SCF.  
The reported statistics are weighted and corrected for multiple 
imputation. Asset definitions are provided in the Appendix. 38
Table 3: Combinations of Stock Investments Held by Stock 
Owners 
Directly Held 
Stocks
Stocks in 
Mutual Funds
Stocks in 
Retirement
Accounts
Proportion
owning the 
Combination 
     
Yes No No  10 
No Yes No 6.4 
No No Yes  43.3 
Yes Yes No  3.2 
No Yes Yes 9.9 
Yes No Yes  16.5 
Yes Yes Yes 10.7 
           
Notes: Pooled data from the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 waves of the SCF.  The 
reported statistics are weighted and corrected for multiple imputation. Asset 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. 39
Table 4: Household Characteristics by Asset Choice 
Variable Whole
sample
Owns
stocks
directly
Owns
mutual
funds
Has
stocks in 
mutual
funds
Owns
retirement
accounts
Has stocks 
in
retirement
accounts
          
Age (mean) 48.9 51.3 51.9 51.2 48.2 46.7
Couple 0.588 0.722 0.703 0.716 0.698 0.715
Single male 0.140 0.124 0.110 0.110 0.114 0.117
Has children 0.435 0.409 0.393 0.404 0.467 0.483
High school graduate 0.509 0.380 0.359 0.362 0.469 0.447
College degree or more 0.337 0.583 0.612 0.611 0.472 0.507
Self-employed 0.113 0.160 0.169 0.164 0.124 0.124
Retired 0.240 0.227 0.234 0.224 0.157 0.116
Unemployed/Inactive 0.051 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.018
White 0.762 0.897 0.910 0.908 0.841 0.851
Poor health 0.061 0.024 0.018 0.016 0.022 0.016
Willingness to take above 
average financial risk 0.205 0.365 0.359 0.375 0.288 0.334
Investment horizon > 10 yrs 0.143 0.214 0.245 0.252 0.196 0.217
Plans to leave a bequest 0.293 0.431 0.444 0.445 0.356 0.369
Has received inheritance 0.199 0.320 0.339 0.345 0.246 0.245
Credit constrained 0.224 0.124 0.085 0.089 0.167 0.166
Works/ed  in the Financial 
Sector 0.204 0.289 0.280 0.280 0.251 0.267
Federal marginal tax rate 
(mean) 0.173 0.232 0.230 0.232 0.220 0.229
Asks Friends/Relatives/Work 
contacts for financial 
information
0.360 0.366 0.346 0.350 0.374 0.391
Uses Internet to obtain financial 
information 0.111 0.205 0.183 0.189 0.155 0.179
Works in high-risk industry 
sector 0.091 0.053 0.061 0.065 0.083 0.076
Non-investment income 
(median) 37,787.7 66,566.1 65,449.0 67,280.7 58,985.4 63,871.5
Net real wealth (median) 57,967.9 157,766.8 161,654.3 162,894.3 99,271.3 101,289.2
Net financial wealth (median) 9,943.3 146,726.3 168,318.1 176,365.1 61,122.7 68,987.8
Notes: Pooled data from the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 waves of the SCF.  The reported statistics are 
weighted and corrected for multiple imputation. Asset definitions are provided in the Appendix. 40
                                         Table 5: Model Specification 
Eqn.  Outcome    Latent propensities  Observed binary outcomes
For each respondent i = 1, …, N:   
(1) Owns stocks    i i i u X DS  c   T
* ) 0 (
* !   i i DS I DS
directly 
(2) Owns mutual funds  i i i Z M Q D  c  
* ) 0 (
* !   i i M I M
(3) Holds stocks in  i i i n W MS  c   E
*
unobserved else , 1 if ) 0 (
*   !   i i i M MS I MS
mutual funds 
(4) Owns retirement  i i i G R H J  c  
* ) 0 (
* !   i i R I R
accounts
(5) Holds stocks in  i i i e Y RS  c   G
*
unobserved else , 1 if ) 0 (
*   !   i i i R RS I RS
retirement accounts 
(6) Error terms     ) , 0 ( ~ ) , , , , ( 5 : ) i i i i i e n u H Q , where ȍ is a symmetric matrix with                    
typical element ȡhj= ȡjh for h,j {u,v,n,İ,e} and j z h,and ȡjj=1 for
    a l l j. The errors in each equation are assumed to be orthogonal to  
    the  predictors. 
Notes: I(.) is an indicator function equal to one if its argument is true, and zero otherwise.  (.) 5 )
denotes the five-variate normal distribution function. 41 4
Table 6: Observed and Predicted Participation Rates 
Asset Choice 
(1) (2) (3) 
Observed
Rate
 Predicted  Rate 
Estimate Std.  Error 
       
Owns stocks directly  0.19 0.21  0.004  *** 
Owns mutual funds  0.18 0.20  0.005  *** 
Owns retirement accounts  0.51 0.51  0.005  *** 
Owns stocks in mutual funds  0.14 0.15  0.005  *** 
Owns stocks in retirement accounts  0.38 0.39  0.005  *** 
Owns stocks in mutual funds | owns mutual funds  0.78 0.78  0.020  *** 
Owns stocks in retirement accounts | owns retirement 
accounts 0.75 0.76  0.008  *** 
Owns stocks directly | owns mutual funds  0.45 0.48  0.013  *** 
Owns stocks directly | owns retirement accounts  0.30 0.33  0.007  *** 
Owns stocks directly | owns stocks in mutual funds  0.46 0.50  0.013  *** 
Owns stocks directly | owns stocks in retirement 
accounts 0.34 0.36  0.009  *** 
Owns mutual funds | owns stocks directly  0.44 0.44  0.012  *** 
Owns mutual funds | owns retirement accounts  0.29 0.31  0.007  *** 
Owns retirement accounts | owns stocks directly  0.81 0.78  0.010  *** 
Owns retirement accounts | owns mutual funds  0.81 0.80  0.010  *** 
Owns stocks in mutual funds | owns stocks directly  0.34 0.35  0.013  *** 
Owns stocks in mutual funds | owns retirement 
accounts 0.23 0.25 0.009  *** 
Owns stocks in mutual funds | owns stocks in 
retirement accounts  0.26 0.27  0.010  *** 
Owns stocks in retirement accounts | owns stocks 
directly  0.68 0.65  0.011  *** 
Owns stocks in retirement accounts | owns stocks in 
mutual funds  0.68 0.68  0.012  *** 
Owns stocks in any form  0.48 0.50  0.005  *** 
Owns stocks directly | owns stocks in any form  0.40 0.43  0.008  *** 
Owns stocks in mutual funds | owns stocks in any 
form 0.30 0.31  0.010  *** 
Owns stocks in retirement accounts | owns stocks in 
any form  0.80 0.79  0.007  *** 
      
Notes: All unconditional probabilities are average probabilities calculated over the full sample. All 
conditional probabilities are average probabilities calculated over the sub-sample we condition on. 
SCF pooled data from 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004 using survey weights and correcting for multiple 
imputation. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  42 4
Table 7: Average Marginal Effects on the Probability of Holding Stocks in Any Form, 
Computed from the Multivariate Probit with Selection and from a Simple Probit Model 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Multivariate probit 
with selection Probit
M. Eff. Std. Error M. Eff. Std. Error
         
Age 0.002 0.000 ***   0.001 0.000 *** 
Couple 0.079 0.008 ***   0.073 0.010 *** 
Single male -0.003 0.010    -0.010 0.013  
Has children -0.012 0.006 *   -0.007 0.008  
High school graduate 0.154 0.012 ***   0.145 0.012 *** 
College degree or more 0.269 0.013 ***   0.261 0.013 *** 
Self-employed -0.081 0.007 ***   -0.087 0.010 *** 
Retired -0.035 0.010 ***   -0.045 0.012 *** 
Unemployed/Inactive -0.089 0.016 ***   -0.115 0.018 *** 
White 0.113 0.008 ***   0.111 0.010 *** 
Poor health -0.119 0.018 ***   -0.112 0.019 *** 
Willingness to take above average financial 
risk
0.121 0.006 ***  
0.136 0.008 *** 
Investment horizon > 10 yrs 0.063 0.007 ***   0.064 0.010 *** 
Asks Friends/Relatives/Work contacts for 
financial information
0.017 0.006 ***   0.030  0.007 *** 
Uses Internet to obtain financial information 0.083 0.009 ***   0.073  0.011 *** 
Non-investment income 0.006 0.002 ***   0.007  0.002 *** 
Net real wealth 0.019 0.001 ***   0.020  0.002 *** 
Net financial wealth 0.004 0.000 ***   0.004  0.000 *** 
Intention to leave a bequest 0.067 0.006 ***   0.065  0.008 *** 
Has received inheritance 0.051 0.006 ***   0.052  0.008 *** 
Credit constrained -0.045 0.008 ***   -0.021  0.009 ** 
Works/ed  in the Financial Sector 0.028 0.006 ***   0.039  0.008 *** 
Works in high-risk industry sector -0.065 0.010 ***   -0.061  0.012 *** 
Federal marginal tax rate 0.024 0.002 ***   0.027  0.002 *** 
Year 1998 0.053 0.007 ***   0.049 0.009 *** 
Year 2001 0.065 0.008 ***   0.064 0.009 *** 
Year 2004 0.057 0.009 ***   0.051 0.010 *** 
                   
Notes: Pooled data from the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 waves of the SCF.  The results for 
income, net real and non equity financial wealth represent median semi-elasticities, while for the 
remaining variables average marginal effects. All estimates are weighted and corrected for multiple 
imputation. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 4
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Table 9: Average Marginal Effects on the Probability of Using a Stockholding Mode, 
Conditional on Stock Ownership 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Directly Held 
Stocks
Stocks in Mutual 
Funds
Stocks in Retirement 
Accounts
M. Eff. Std. Error M. Eff. Std. Error M. Eff. Std. Error
                      
Age 0.002 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 ***
Married 0.052 0.014 *** 0.002 0.015 0.037 0.010 ***
Single male 0.058 0.019 *** -0.035 0.018 ** -0.018 0.014
Has children -0.014 0.011 -0.004 0.010 -0.001  0.008
High school graduate 0.071 0.020 *** 0.089 0.018 *** 0.016 0.016
College degree or more 0.159 0.021 *** 0.178 0.019 *** 0.019 0.017
Self-employed 0.059 0.013 *** 0.047 0.013 *** -0.128 0.010 ***
Retired 0.093 0.018 *** 0.084 0.019 *** -0.129 0.016 ***
Unemployed/Inactive 0.126 0.031 *** 0.061 0.033 * -0.202 0.028 ***
White 0.063 0.015 *** 0.058 0.014 *** 0.028 0.011 **
Poor health -0.016 0.029 -0.070 0.030 ** -0.055 0.025 **
Willingness to take above 
average financial risk
0.084 0.010 *** 0.048 0.010 *** 0.039 0.007 ***
Investment horizon > 10 yrs 0.011 0.011 0.039 0.011 *** 0.029 0.007 ***
Asks Friends/Relatives/Work 
contacts for financial 
information
-0.006 0.010 -0.005 0.009 0.020  0.008 ***
Uses Internet to obtain 
financial information
0.073 0.014 *** 0.041 0.012 *** 0.015 0.010
Non-investment income -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.007  0.002 ***
Net real wealth 0.027 0.002 *** 0.006 0.002 *** -0.002 0.001
Net financial wealth 0.004 0.001 *** 0.003 0.001 *** 0.000 0.000
Intention to leave a bequest 0.078 0.010 *** 0.045 0.009 *** -0.006 0.007
Has received inheritance 0.053 0.010 *** 0.049 0.010 *** -0.007 0.008
Credit constrained 0.018 0.014 -0.079 0.014 *** -0.012 0.011
Works/ed  in the Financial 
Sector
0.055 0.011 *** 0.012 0.010 -0.012 0.008
Works in high-risk industry 
sector
-0.053 0.016 *** 0.009 0.018 -0.031 0.012 **
Federal marginal tax rate 0.010 0.002 *** 0.008 0.002 *** 0.011 0.002 ***
Year 1998 -0.008 0.014 0.020 0.013 0.049  0.010 ***
Year 2001 -0.021 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.070  0.011 ***
Year 2004 -0.029 0.014 ** -0.022 0.012 * 0.081 0.011 ***
                
Notes: Pooled data from the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 waves of the SCF.  The results for income, net real and non equity financial 
wealth represent median semi-elasticities, while for the remaining variables average marginal effects. All estimates are corrected for 
multiple imputation. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 46 4
Table 10: Average Marginal Effects on the Probability of Holding Stocks Directly or in Mutual 
Funds 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Directly Held Stocks, 
Conditional on 
Holding any 
Retirement Accounts
Stocks in Mutual 
Funds, Conditional 
on Holding any 
Retirement Accounts
Stocks in Mutual 
Funds, Unconditional
M. Eff. Std. Error M. Eff. Std. Error M. Eff. Std. Error
                     
Age 0.002 0.000 *** 0.001 0.000 * 0.001 0.000 *
Couple 0.065 0.011 *** 0.023 0.011 ** 0.021 0.008 ***
Single male 0.040 0.014 *** -0.020 0.013 -0.016 0.009 *
Has children -0.015 0.008 * -0.007 0.008 -0.005 0.005
High school graduate 0.100 0.013 *** 0.092 0.011 *** 0.068 0.007 ***
College degree or more 0.206 0.014 *** 0.188 0.013 *** 0.146 0.009 ***
Self-employed 0.013 0.010 0.014 0.009 0.003 0.006
Retired 0.055 0.013 *** 0.053 0.014 *** 0.034 0.010 ***
Unemployed/Inactive 0.053 0.023 ** 0.021 0.024 0.006 0.016
White 0.086 0.011 *** 0.071 0.010 *** 0.054 0.007 ***
Poor health -0.058 0.021 *** -0.077 0.021 *** -0.059 0.013 ***
Willingness to take above 
average financial risk
0.108 0.009 *** 0.070 0.008 *** 0.056 0.006 ***
Investment horizon > 10 yrs 0.030 0.009 *** 0.045 0.009 *** 0.036 0.007 ***
Asks Friends/Relatives/Work 
contacts for financial 
information
0.002 0.008 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.005
Uses Internet to obtain 
financial information
0.085 0.012 *** 0.053 0.010 *** 0.042 0.007 ***
Non-investment income 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001
Net real wealth 0.028 0.002 *** 0.009 0.002 *** 0.007 0.001 ***
Net financial wealth 0.005 0.001 *** 0.003 0.001 *** 0.003 0.000 ***
Intention to leave a bequest 0.083 0.009 *** 0.053 0.007 *** 0.041 0.005 ***
Has received inheritance 0.059 0.008 *** 0.051 0.008 *** 0.039 0.006 ***
Credit constrained -0.005 0.011 -0.066 0.011 *** -0.048 0.007 ***
Works/ed  in the Financial 
Sector
0.051 0.009 *** 0.017 0.008 ** 0.014 0.005 **
Works in high-risk industry 
sector
-0.061 0.012 *** -0.014 0.013 -0.013 0.009
Federal marginal tax rate 0.015 0.002 *** 0.012 0.002 *** 0.010 0.001 ***
Year 1998 0.020 0.011 * 0.034 0.010 *** 0.023 0.007 ***
Year 2001 0.015 0.011 0.031 0.010 *** 0.022 0.007 ***
Year 2004 0.005 0.011 0.003 0.010 0.002 0.007
          
Notes: Pooled data from the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 waves of the SCF.  The results for income, net real and non equity financial wealth 
represent median semi-elasticities, while for the remaining variables average marginal effects. All estimates are corrected for multiple 
imputation. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 4
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Figure 1: Graphical Presentation of the Model 
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Endnotes
1 See Campbell  (2006), Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Heaton and Lucas (2000), Gollier (2001), Viceira (2001), 
Campbell and Viceira (2002), Haliassos and Michaelides (2003), Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005), and Gomes 
and Michaelides (2005), the contributions in Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2001), and Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli 
(2003). 
2 The report states that “[t]he growth of equity ownership among America’s individual investors during the past 20 
years has been fueled largely by the expansion of defined contribution retirement plans, particularly 401(k) plans, 
which widely use stock mutual funds and other types of mutual funds as investment options. […] Between 1999 and 
2005, the number of households owning equities through employer-sponsored retirement plans grew by 5.2 million. 
Over the same period, the number of households owning equities outside these plans increased by 2.4 million. […] 
Defined contribution retirement plans also play an important role in introducing investors to equity investing and 
influence investors’ initial equity purchases. Today, nearly half of all equity owners began investing in equities by 
purchasing stock mutual fund shares through retirement plans at work. Among younger equity investors, the 
proportion is even greater.” (p. 2,3) 
3 For further details on the SCF see, for example, Kenickell (2000). More information on the construction of our 
variables can be found in Appendix A.  
4 For this reason we only report the proportions by pooling all four years together. 
5 Using findings in Carroll and Samwick (1997) we consider Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining and Construction 
as high income risk sectors. 
6 Greene uses a multivariate probit with censoring to study default in credit card loans. This model choice is dictated 
by the fact that defaults are observed only for the selected sample of credit card holders. 
7 We use those authors’ equation formulation and notation for our model setup. See also Christelis and Georgarakos 
(2008), who have used a multivariate probit with selection to study household investment in foreign assets. 
8 Information on some of the covariates we use in our estimation is available only since 1995 
9 This approach, commonly followed in the stockholding participation literature, was found by Ameriks and Zeldes 
(2004) to produce more plausible patterns of stock ownership than cohort effects. 
10 Since one cannot invest in stocks in mutual funds without owning mutual funds, we cannot have M=0 and MS=1,
and thus MMS always. The same is true for retirement accounts, i.e. RRS.
11 We first perform the estimation and compute robust standard errors within each implicate, and then combine the 
estimates and standard errors across implicates using the rules described in Rubin (1987). 
12 We use 150 Halton draws and the Stata function mnvp to implement the GHK simulator, as described in 
Cappellari and Jenkins (2006). 
13 For example, in our model, the equation for mutual fund ownership can be separately identified from the equation 
for stock investment in mutual funds by using the subsample of those who do not own any mutual funds. The latter 
equation can be separately identified from the equation for stock investment in retirement accounts by using the 
subsample of those who own mutual funds but do not own any retirement accounts. 
14 We evaluate the probabilities of all asset combinations of interest for each household in the sample by using the 
GHK simulator and the same Halton draws used in the estimation of the model. 
15 Given that stock investment through mutual funds can only be achieved through the ownership of mutual funds, 
) 1 , 1 ( ) 1 (         M MS P MS P
16 For dummy variables we consider a change from 0 to 1. For income- and wealth-related continuous variables we 
present median semi-elasticities (corresponding to a change of 5,000 dollars in 2004 prices). We choose the median 
since semi-elasticities involve multiplication by the amounts, which are very skewed. Hence the median is to be 
preferred to the mean in this case. The marginal effect of age is evaluated when age is incremented by one for all 
household heads, while the marginal effect of the federal marginal tax rate is evaluated when the rate is incremented 
by five percentage points for all households. 
17 This probability is equal to the sum of the probabilities of all asset combinations in which at least one stockholding 
mode is chosen. 
18 Even a high-school certificate makes substantial difference (just under 8 pp). 
19 SCF asks explicitly whether a household asks friends or uses the Internet to obtain financial information, allowing 
for a direct assessment of their contribution on stockholding. 
20 Net financial wealth enters in each equation after deducting the amount of the asset in question in order to avoid 
endogeneity problems.   
21 We modify the federal marginal tax rate as in Alessie, Hochguertel and Van Soest (2004), in order to avoid 
endogeneity issues due to dividend income (see Appendix A). 50 5
22 The finding is also consistent with results on the role of education in encouraging gains and avoiding losses in 
mutual funds in Bilias, Georgarakos, Haliassos (2008). 
23 One might conjecture that the lack of significance of most variables might be due to the fact that roughly 80% of 
mutual fund investors also hold stocks in those mutual funds. As a result, the samples used in the estimation of the 
two choices are similar, potentially leading to this lack of significance in the second stage equation. However, 
samples are also similar in the case of retirement accounts, where we find very significant effects of numerous 
variables in the second stage equation (see below). 
24 We find statistically significant positive correlations between unobserved factors influencing participation in direct 
stockholding and each one of mutual funds, retirement accounts, and stocks in retirement accounts; but not with 
holding stock mutual funds. In addition, unobserved factors influencing participation in stock mutual funds are 
correlated with those influencing  participation in retirement accounts. 
25 For example, the relevant probability for stocks in mutual funds is shown in (14). 
26 As regards stockholding through retirement accounts we have already seen that there is a distinct second threshold 
that owners of retirement accounts have to clear. We cannot compare conditional and unconditional marginal effects 
for stocks in retirement accounts because, by definition, one cannot hold stocks in this form without owning a 
retirement account. 
27  Indirectly for stock mutual funds, by facilitating investment in mutual funds. 
28 We do not evaluate marginal effects at sample means since this practice can lead to severely misleading results 
(see Train, 2003, pp. 33-34). CFS Working Paper Series: 
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